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PRIVACY VERSUS PROTECTION: EXPLORING
THE BOUNDARIES OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE IN THE
INTERNET AGE
Kimberly A. Horn*
INTRODUCTION
Although his best selling novel 1984 was written over a half-cen-
tury ago, George Orwell may have been on to something when he
penned the phrase, "Big Brother Is Watching You."' While the
United States bears no resemblance to the totalitarian state of
Oceania, a futuristic world where citizens are under the constant
surveillance and mind control of government, 2 our country's con-
cern over governmental surveillance is a definitive reality in the
Twenty-First Century.
In fact, even though the debate over the use of certain surveil-
lance tools has quieted since the tragic events of September 11,
2001,3 the concern over electronic surveillance is far from over.4
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A. Political Science, Ameri-
can University, 1998. I would like to thank Professors Ronald Blum and Daniel Rich-
man for their guidance and inspiration in writing this Note. I would also like to give
special thanks to my family for supporting me in all of my endeavors.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 3 (1949).
2. See id. at 4-5.
3. See generally Congressional Statements, FBI Press Room, at http://
www.fbi.gov (last visited Apr. 15, 2002) (highlighting all Bureau testimony before
Congress from 1998 through 2002). Before the events of September 11, 2001, there
was a significant debate in Congress regarding the use of sophisticated new tools to
conduct electronic surveillance. See infra Part II.A. Yet, since the terrorist acts on
that date there have been no congressional hearings on the subject. See FBI, Con-
gressional Statements, FBI Press Room, at http://www.fbi.gov (last visited Apr. 15,
2002).
4. Neil Robinson, New Laws Seek to Balance Privacy and Surveillance, JANE'S
INTELLIGENCE REV., Jan. 1, 2002 ("The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington
on September 11, 2001 have rekindled a passionate debate about protection of civil
liberties and national security."). This is especially true since the passage of The USA
Patriot Act, which was signed into law by President Bush on October 26, 2001. See
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
The USA Patriot Act, as it is ironically dubbed, significantly increases the govern-
ment's law enforcement powers at the expense of civil liberties. ACLU, USA Patriot
Act Boosts Government Powers While Cutting Back on Traditional Checks and Bal-
ances, ACLU Legislative Analysis on USA Patriot Act, at http://www.aclu.org (dated
Nov. 1, 2001); see also William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
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This concern is especially apparent among privacy advocates who,
for many years, have applied constant pressure and waged numer-
ous legal battles against the government's tactics. 5
The relationship between privacy advocates and law enforce-
ment has long been a tumultuous one, leaving privacy advocates
with an inherent distrust of the devices utilized by law enforcement
to conduct electronic surveillance.6 Yet, this distrust may be com-
pletely justified, considering that new technologies have enhanced
law enforcement's ability to conduct highly sophisticated surveil-
lance on all citizens. 7 One such method of surveillance is the con-
troversial new system dubbed "Carnivore" by its creators at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). 8
Carnivore is a diagnostic tool designed by the FBI to intercept
and collect the electronic communications of criminal suspects.9 It
is a technologically advanced surveillance system designed to
counter increasingly sophisticated criminals who use the Internet
to conduct illegal activities.' ° Carnivore is an electronic device that
is actually installed on a computer network," most frequently on
the networks of Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), and it has the
2001 at A31 (calling on the government to hold onto American liberties while defend-
ing the United States against those who are trying to trump our freedom).
5. See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Communication Center, EPIC's Litigation Docket,
About EPIC, at http://www.epic.org (last updated Dec. 21, 1999).
6. Kathryn Balint, Attack on America Personal Technology, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Mar. 11, 2002, at El; David Pogue, State of the Art: Thinking About Gadgets
For a More Sober World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at G1 ("Before September llth,
the public outcry for privacy had become almost deafening."). For a discussion of
some of privacy advocates' specific criticisms, see infra Part II.A.
7. Lisa Guernsey, Living Under an Electronic Eye, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at
GI (recognizing how advances in computer technology have allowed for greater sur-
veillance capabilities). For a discussion on the purported capabilities of one such sur-
veillance tool, see infra Part II.A.
8. See generally Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's Wiretaps To Scan E-Mail Spark
Concern, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3 (naming the system "Carnivore" because
of its unique ability to get to "the meat" of an enormous amount of data). Favoring a
more neutral name than "Carnivore", in February 2001, the FBI renamed the contro-
versial system DCS1000, which stands for Digital Collection System. Washington
Wire, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2001, at Al. This name change, however, has done nothing
to lessen the concerns of privacy advocates. Eric J. Sinrod, EPIC Stalks Big Game in
FBI's Carnivore, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 2002, at 5.
9. FBI, Carnivore: Diagnostic Tool, FBI Programs and Initiatives [hereinafter
Carnivore: Diagnostic Tool], at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/carnivore/carnivore2.htm
(last visited on September 21, 2002).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. During the course of a criminal investigation, Carnivore is installed "at the
office of the suspect's Internet service provider." John Schwartz, Computer Security
Experts Question Internet Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at A16.
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ability to capture and store information traveling over such
networks.1
2
Although Carnivore has been in existence since 1997, it was not
until the year 2000 that its existence became public. 13 Upon its un-
veiling, Carnivore was met with a great deal of controversy and
distrust, drawing criticism from privacy groups because of its inva-
sive capabilities.14 The implementation of Carnivore effectively re-
vived a longstanding debate over the technical and legal
capabilities associated with electronic surveillance and the effect of
such capabilities on the privacy rights of individuals. a5 This debate
has existed since Congress adopted comprehensive federal wiretap
legislation with the passage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968.16
Specifically, privacy fights advocates argue that Carnivore in-
vades the rights of innocent Internet users because it must search
through and filter out their emails to reach the targeted communi-
cations of a criminal suspect.17 Moreover, because Carnivore has
the ability to capture a broad range of communications traveling
across an ISPs network, beyond the targeted communications spec-
ified in a court warrant, privacy advocates argue that the govern-
ment has the ability to conduct unauthorized surveillance on
innocent Americans.
18
Although the threat of unauthorized surveillance by law enforce-
ment has always existed and at times been a reality, 19 since its in-
ception, federal wiretap laws have provided safeguards that protect
individuals against the consequences of such governmental abuse.
Specifically, Title III requires that the interception of communica-
tions outside the scope of authorized surveillance must be mini-
mized,20 and it states that unlawfully intercepted communications
12. Carnivore: Diagnostic Tool, supra note 9.
13. Biting Into Carnivore, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 1, 2002, at E3 (noting
that Carnivore was unveiled in July 2000).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. Sinrod, supra note 8.
16. In fact, privacy considerations were among the most important concerns of
Congress in their adoption of Title III. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (2000)). For further discussion of the legislative intent behind Title III,
see infra Part I.B.
17. King & Bridis, supra note 8.
18. John Schwartz, Fighting Crime Online: Who is in Harm's Way?, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2001, at G1.
19. For a discussion of the FBI's role in illegal surveillance during the Hoover
years, see discussion infra Part I.B.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); see also infra text accompanying note 101.
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may be found inadmissible in court proceedings. 21 These safe-
guards recognize the inevitability that traditional eavesdropping
devices may record communications beyond those specified in a
court order, despite the requirement that the government file par-
ticularized, as opposed to general, intercept orders.
While the FBI claims it has not used Carnivore to intercept un-
authorized communications, critics of the system remain skeptical,
and with arguably good reason. These critics are aware that Carni-
vore is specifically designed to capture electronic communications,
which are not protected by the same safeguards as traditional oral
and wire communications under Title 111.22 Specifically, because
the exclusionary rule,23 which warrants illegally obtained evidence
inadmissible in court, does not apply to electronic communications,
the FBI would not be prevented from using unauthorized elec-
tronic interceptions against a criminal suspect in court. Facing this
reality, and mindful of the FBI's past abuses of power,24 privacy
groups are not willing to accept the FBI's assurances. Instead,
these groups and many members of Congress favor reforms that
will impose stricter requirements for Carnivore's use.
While the constitutionality of electronic surveillance has had a
long legal tradition in the United States, the recent debate over
Carnivore signals that the legal battles over law enforcement's sur-
veillance techniques are far from over. In fact, in light of the re-
sults of a study of Carnivore's technical capabilities, the legal
battles may be just beginning. As a result, Congress may need to
step in and address the delicate balance between privacy and law
enforcement interests and amend federal wiretap law accordingly.
Congress may also have to address the reality of individual privacy
expectations in the Internet Age.
The expansion of the Internet superhighway has led to a con-
stant competition between law enforcement and criminals and has
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10); see also infra text accompanying note 102.
22. In fact, Carnivore was originally authorized under the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act, which sets forth much lower authorization standards for the inter-
ception of "electronic communications." See infra notes 113-142 and accompanying
text for the requirements necessary to intercept electronic communications under the
ECPA. Today, The USA Patriot Act specifically authorizes law enforcement to im-
plement Carnivore under the existing ECPA standards for pen registers and trap-and-
trace devices. See infra Part II.D. As a result, Carnivore may be utilized without a
showing of probable cause. See infra Part II.D. For further discussion of the neces-
sary standards to implement a pen register or trap-and-trace device, see infra notes
127-142 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of this legal principle see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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forced law enforcement to implement new technologies that will
enable them to detect criminal activity." Accordingly, Congress
must keep pace with these technological advancements and enact
legislation reflective of our changing world.
Part I of this Note begins with an overview of the common law
tradition and congressional intent behind federal wiretap law. It
then analyzes the Supreme Court decisions that set the constitu-
tional standards for federal wiretap law and discusses how Con-
gress tailored these standards to safeguard individual privacy
rights. Part I also discusses subsequent legislation that was enacted
in response to technological advancements in the telecommunica-
tions industry. Part I concludes by focusing on current challenges
imposed on law enforcement by the proliferation of computer-re-
lated crime.
Part II highlights law enforcement's response to the growing di-
lemma of computer-related crime through the implementation of
the controversial Carnivore system. This Part also discusses the ar-
guments surrounding the use of Carnivore and analyzes recent
court decisions that have signaled a decline in Internet users' legiti-
mate expectation of privacy. In addition, Part II analyzes the effect
that recent litigation may have on the FBI's ability to force ISPs to
install Carnivore on their systems, as well as the effect that the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have had on the implementa-
tion procedures associated with electronic surveillance.
Part III of this Note argues that Congress must implement
tougher standards with respect to electronic surveillance. The
Note concludes by arguing that the interception of electronic com-
munications, through devices such as Carnivore, should be held to
the same standards as traditional surveillance activities under Title
III, and that federal wiretap law must be amended to reflect our
changing times.
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR LEGALIZED SURVEILLANCE
A. The History Behind Federal Wiretap Law
Ratified in 1791, the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was
adopted to safeguard individuals against governmental intrusion.
According to the Fourth Amendment:
25. Cybercrime: Statement Before S. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. for the
Dep'ts of Commerce, Justice, State the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 106th Cong. 6
(2000) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [here-
inafter Freeh Testimony].
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.26
The constitutional limitations imposed by the Fourth Amend-
ment, with respect to the methods law enforcement agents utilize
to acquire evidence have provoked substantial debate for over a
century. 27 Although law enforcement officials still rely heavily on
traditional search warrants to seize personal property, over the
years they have recognized the increasing need for more sophisti-
cated techniques to combat the growing crime rate. As these
crime-fighting mechanisms have evolved over time, so too has the
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court was first asked to consider the constitution-
ality of electronic surveillance as early as 1928, nearly fifty years
after the invention of the telephone.28 In Olmstead v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless wire tapping of
telephones did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 29 Relying on
the idea that the Fourth Amendment protected only tangible prop-
erty,30 the Supreme Court held that the tapping of telephone wires
did not constitute a search and seizure because the surveillance did
not amount to the actual "search" or "seizure" of physical prop-
26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27. See generally Jared J. Nylund, Comment, Fire With Fire: How the FBI Set Tech-
nical Standards For the Telecommunications Industry Under CALEA, 8 COMMLAw
CONSPECTUS 329, 330 (2000). It is interesting to note that just over a century ago, all
pertinent evidence was deemed admissible, regardless of the method under which it
was obtained. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928)
("American courts of law observed the common law rule that 'if the tendered evi-
dence was pertinent, the method of obtaining it was unimportant."')). The Supreme
Court later recognized an exception to this practice, adopting what is today known as
the "exclusionary rule," where evidence obtained in an unlawful manner is deemed
inadmissible in court. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding
that a lower court's admission of papers seized in direct violation of the constitution
constituted "prejudicial error").
28. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438; see also S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 35 (1968). See
generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, Wiretapping and Electronic Sur-
veillance, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 245, 246 (2d ed. 1992).
29. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
30. Id. at 465-66. Finding it unjustifiable to enlarge the language of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court stated that there can be no Fourth Amendment violation "un-
less there has been an official search and seizure of [a defendant's] person or such a
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of
his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure." Id. at 466.
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erty, nor did it require law enforcement to trespass upon the de-
fendants' homes or offices.31
Following the Court's decision in Olmstead, federal law enforce-
ment's ability to prosecute criminals through the use of intercepted
communications was severely impaired when Congress passed the
Communications Act of 1934 ("§ 605").12 As originally written,
§ 605 held in part, that "no person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person. ' 33 Yet, despite the
purported benefit of protecting the privacy rights of individuals,
§ 605 did not guarantee absolute protection against government
surveillance. For example, the law did not cover wiretapping by
consent, and federal law enforcement was able to circumvent its
prohibitions by arguing, "that § 605 did not prohibit wiretapping
alone, but only [wire]tapping followed by 'divulgence."' 34 § 605
also did not extend coverage to state law enforcement officials, nor
did it account for technological advancements that would produce
eavesdropping devices falling outside the prohibitions of the law.35
Because § 605 left loopholes regarding the application of the
wiretapping prohibition, federal agents continued to use wiretaps
to further criminal investigations.36 This practice continued until
1937, when the Supreme Court held that the wiretapping prohibi-
tion did in fact apply to federal law enforcement agents; therefore,
any communications intercepted by law enforcement without the
prior consent of the sender were deemed inadmissible at trial.37 In
31. Id. at 464.
32. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714). The amended act now provides for an exception with respect
to Chapter 119 of the U.S. Code. See THE FBI: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE
GUIDE 21 (Athan G. Theoharis et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter FBI REFERENCE
GUIDE].
33. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 246 (quoting former 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1934)).
34. Id. at 247.
35. Id.
36. FBI REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 21.
37. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384-85 (1937) [hereinafter Nar-
done I]. In a later case, the Supreme Court extended this exclusionary rule by holding
that § 605 bars evidence obtained directly by wiretapping, as well as evidence ob-
tained through leads generated by such wiretapping. See Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) [hereinafter Nardone II]; FBI REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note
32, at 21.
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addition, the Court dismissed any case where the indictment was
based on such illegally obtained evidence.38
As the law continued to develop, the Supreme Court extended
constitutional protection beyond the mere seizure of tangible
items, holding that the Fourth Amendment extended to oral state-
ments recorded without any "technical trespass under the local
property law."39 This decision was later expanded in Berger v. New
York,40 a landmark decision that played a significant role in shap-
ing federal wiretap law.
In Berger, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute
authorizing electronic eavesdropping by law enforcement officials
investigating certain types of crimes.41 In its decision, the Court
held that conversations fall within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and that the seizure of conversations constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search.41 In addition, the Court stated that ev-
idence obtained by surveillance conducted in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in court.43
Concluding that the New York statute was so broad that it failed
to meet certain constitutional standards under the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court, "delineated the constitutional criteria
that electronic surveillance legislation should contain. '44 For ex-
ample, in addition to providing proof of probable cause, the Court
held that there is a Fourth Amendment requirement of "particular-
ity.'' 45 Particularity means that rather than utilizing a general war-
rant to conduct searches, law enforcement would be required to
delineate in the warrant the specific details regarding the person,
place or thing to be seized, as well as the nature of the crime in
question and the type of conversation sought.46 The Berger Court
also reasoned that there should be "precise and discriminate" pro-
cedures in place to minimize the unauthorized interception of con-
38. FBI REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 21. Yet, even after Nardone II was
decided, the FBI continued to conduct secret wiretaps of "subversive groups" and of
individuals suspected of spying. Id. These activities were authorized by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who justified his "secret directive" by claiming that the Su-
preme Court's rulings did not prohibit the government from obtaining intelligence for
national defense purposes. Id.
39. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
40. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
41. Id. at 44.
42. Id. at 51.
43. Id. at 55.
44. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 36 (1968). See generally Berger, 388 U.S. at 54-64.
45. Berger, 388 U.S. at 55.
46. Id. at 55-56; see also S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 43.
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versations unconnected to the crime being investigated.47
Expressing concern over the authorization and extensions of sur-
veillance pursuant to a single showing of probable cause, the Court
maintained that the continuance of electronic surveillance should
be permitted only upon renewed showings of probable cause.48 In
addition, the Court stated that the executing officer should have to
"make a return" on the eavesdropping warrant to prove what was
seized, and that there must be a showing of exigent circumstances
to overcome the defect of not giving prior notice for the search.49
Nearly six months after the Berger decision laid out the constitu-
tional requirements that the Supreme Court dictated should em-
body electronic surveillance legislation, the Court reaffirmed these
standards in Katz v. United States.50 In Katz, the Supreme Court
held that, "The Government's activities in electronically listening
to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon
which [the petitioner] justifiably relied ... and thus constituted a
'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.""1 The Court made it clear that there was no constitutional
significance in the fact that the electronic listening device used to
make the interception did not physically "penetrate" the wall of
the phone booth. 2 Furthermore, Katz concluded that, although
the agents conducting the surveillance exercised restraint, their
failure to obtain prior judicial approval was "per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. '5 3 The Court held that such "ante-
cedent justification" was a "constitutional precondition" for elec-
tronic surveillance. 4
Recognizing the obvious need for national legislation to set uni-
form standards and to implement "comprehensive, fair and effec-
tive reform, '5 5 Congress adopted the constitutional standards laid
out in Berger and Katz as a guide for drafting federal wiretap legis-
lation.56 As a result, less than one year after these landmark deci-
sions, Congress implemented comprehensive federal wiretap
legislation with the passage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
47. Berger, 388 U.S. at 58. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 267.
48. Berger, 388 U.S. at 59.
49. Id. at 60; S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 43.
50. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 43.
51. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 357.
54. Id. at 359; see also S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 44.
55. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 38.
56. Id. at 44.
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trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968.1' Under Title III, Congress pro-
hibited all wiretapping and electronic surveillance, except by
persons authorized under law, including law enforcement officials
engaged in the investigation of certain crimes. 58 According to the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, "In enacting Title III,
Congress sought to regulate ... the use of electronic surveillance as
an investigative tool and the disclosure of materials obtained
through such surveillance."59
Title III was enacted in response to the Court's recognition that
electronic surveillance did not constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, as long as such surveillance was conducted in a legal
manner. Although Congress recognized that electronic surveillance
was an essential law enforcement mechanism, a° it also hoped to
safeguard individual privacy rights by delineating a rigorous set of
requirements for how such surveillance could be conducted. 61 By
incorporating the criteria set forth in Berger and Katz, Congress
created a strict standard for surveillance that extends beyond the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.62
At the time of its passage, Title III was seen as an "essential tool
to law enforcement officials in waging all-out war against organized
crime."63 This continues to be true today, as electronic surveillance
is seen as "one of the most important capabilities 'a4 in gathering
evidence to fight many different types of crime, including terrorism
57. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
III, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)); see also Susan
Kopecky, Note, Dealing With Intercepted Communications: Title III of the Omnibus
Control and Safe Streets Act in Civil Litigation, 12 REV. LITIG. 441, 442 (1993) (noting
that Title III was "the first comprehensive federal legislation pertaining to wiretap-
ping and electronic surveillance").
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511. However, Title III is applicable to intercepted evidence
in all cases, including civil and criminal cases. Kopecky, supra note 57, at 442.
59. Chong v. DEA, 929 F.2d 729, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972)).
60. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
61. For a detailed analysis of the safeguards imposed by Title III, see infra Part
I.B. It remains unclear whether Congress's central goal in enacting Title III was to
secure civil liberties or to ensure authorization for law enforcement activities. For
instance, it has been suggested that Title III was passed to "address the privacy con-
cerns created by the ever-increasing development and use of electronic surveillance
equipment." Kopecky, supra note 57, at 442. At the same time, however, Kopecky
acknowledges that Title III was enacted as a way to authorize the government to
acquire "information needed to maintain effective law enforcement." Id. For further
discussion, see infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
62. Infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
63. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 145 (1968).
64. Carnivore: Diagnostic Tool, supra note 9.
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and drug trafficking. Recognizing the importance of electronic sur-
veillance, many states have developed laws similar to Title III, au-
thorizing state courts to issue orders for oral, wire, or electronic
surveillance.6" As of 1999, a total of forty-five jurisdictions had
such laws.66
B. Privacy Versus Protection: Congress Strikes a Balance
While there is little doubt that the use of electronic surveillance
is critical to law enforcement's crime fighting efforts,67 the author-
ity granted to law enforcement by Title III was difficult to achieve.
As is evident from its legislative history, the passage of Title III
sparked considerable debate, leaving many legislators concerned
about Title III's effect on individual privacy rights. In particular,
some members of Congress believed that the authority granted to
law enforcement presented a "grave threat to privacy," with one
senator characterizing Title III as the "End to Privacy Act.
68
During its debate over Title III, Congress recognized the tre-
mendous impact that technological advancements could have on
privacy rights. Congress understood that the privacy of communi-
cations was "seriously jeopardized" by the technological advance-
ments in surveillance, 69 and that such advancements could
ultimately lead to abuse by law enforcement. 70 Accordingly, pri-
vacy protections were an "overriding" concern of Congress, in its
consideration of Title 111.71
Recognizing that the current status of the law "serve[d] neither
the interests of privacy nor of law enforcement, 72 Congress passed
Title III in 1968. Despite congressional concerns over privacy,
Congress ultimately concluded that the advantages of such legisla-
65. LEONIDAS R. MECHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 2000 WIRETAP REPORT 7 (2002) [hereinafter 2000 WIRETAP REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap00.
66. Id. These jurisdictions include the federal government, the District of Colum-
bia, the Virgin Islands, and forty-two states.
67. See generally id. at 10-11 (noting the importance of electronic surveillance in
obtaining arrests and convictions). Although electronic surveillance is most often as-
sociated with criminal litigation, it is important to note that Title III also applies to
evidence intercepted in civil cases. Kopecky, supra note 57, at 442.
68. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 116.
69. Id. at 36.
70. Id. at 116.
71. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972).
72. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 36-37 (quoting THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967)) (internal quotations omitted).
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tion outweighed the disadvantages.7 3 Specifically, Congress recog-
nized that conducting surveillance was an essential element in law
enforcement's ability to detect crime.14 Rather than stifle law en-
forcement's efforts to gather vital information by denying it the
ability to conduct surveillance, Congress realized that it could safe-
guard the privacy of oral and written communications by defining
the circumstances under which such surveillance would be author-
ized.75 As a result, Title III was offered as an attempt to strike a
balance between the two competing interests: privacy and
protection.76
To prevent law enforcement from using electronic surveillance to
infringe upon individual privacy rights, the drafters of Title III in-
stituted "an elaborate system of checks and safeguards '77 that ex-
tended beyond the probable cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. 78 Congress set out specific guidelines related to sur-
veillance, including provisions for the initiation of surveillance, lim-
ited disclosure, and penalties for unauthorized interception. Such
safeguards were crucial, considering the widespread abuses by the
FBI during this period under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover.79
During Hoover's reign as the Director of the Bureau of Investi-
gation from 1924 to 1972, illegal wiretaps and break-ins were com-
mon practice for federal agents who sought to gather intelligence
on the "subversive activities" of radical groups, political leaders,
73. Id. at 139. Citing their responsibilities as legislators, one senator wrote,
"There is a point at which individual privacy and rights yield to the public safety." Id.
at 137.
74. Id. ("Modern surveillance techniques are urgently needed if law enforcement
institutions are successfully to perform their sworn duty of protecting the public.");
see also In re An Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire Communications, 413 F.
Supp. 1321, 1331 (1976). Congress was especially concerned about the growth of or-
ganized crime. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 145.
75. See Chong v. DEA, 929 F.2d 729, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Gelbard, 408
U.S. at 48.
76. In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156, 1159 (2d. Cir. 1974); S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 155.
According to Senate Report 1097, Title III was constructed for the dual purpose of
"protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and delineating on a uni-
form basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and
oral communications may be authorized." S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 36; see also United
States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd 633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.
1980).
77. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 138.
78. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. at 107.
79. Ironically, Hoover was appointed Director of the Bureau of Investigation,
which was later renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 1924 in an effort to
eradicate the surveillance abuses during World War I, to "ensure tighter discipline"
within the Bureau, prevent future political spying, and improve the Bureau's public
image. FBI REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 11.
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and public officials, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and
other civil rights leaders.80 These searches, although illegal, were
part of a "secret directive"'81 to eliminate the threat of communism
and organized crime within U.S. borders. Because of the secretive
nature of these operations, the activities of the FBI were not moni-
tored closely, leading to widespread abuses of power,82 that were
ultimately subject to public disclosure. The public uproar over the
government's "unchecked" ability to eavesdrop on American citi-
zens prompted the Senate to conduct lengthy hearings in the mid-
1960s regarding the FBI's surveillance activities.83 In light of the
disclosures made during the 1960s and 1970s, Hoover was consid-
ered by many to be "the perpetrator of massive, systemic and vi-
cious violations of the constitutional rights of American citizens. 84
One of the most significant safeguards built into Title III is the
requirement that law enforcement officials obtain judicial authori-
zation prior to conducting electronic surveillance. 8- This require-
ment is significant because, unlike a typical search warrant, which
only requires a Fourth Amendment showing of probable cause for
judicial approval, the requirements to obtain a Title III intercept
order are far more stringent. For example, law enforcement offi-
cials must obtain authorization from a senior official at the Justice
Department before they may apply to the court for an order au-
thorizing interception.8 6 After this approval is obtained, the inter-
ception application must then be filed with a federal district judge,
80. The FBI admittedly used "improper and illegal methods" in its wiretapping
surveillance of Dr. King and in its efforts to collect personal files on various congress-
men. KATHRYN S. OLMSTEAD, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE
POST-WATERGATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CIA AND FBI 37 (1996); see also FBI
REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 22.
81. FBI REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 21. This "secret directive" was orig-
inally authorized by President Roosevelt in the wake of Nardone I. See supra notes
37-38 and accompanying text.
82. FBI REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 21.
83. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1364.
While these hearings shed light on the problem and ultimately prompted Congress to
consider Title III, a great deal of the FBI's illegal practices were not disclosed until
the aftermath of the Watergate scandal. See generally FBI REFERENCE GUIDE, supra
note 32, at 111.
84. FBI REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 101.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2000). There is, however, an exception that allows for
immediate interception in certain emergency situations. In such situations, law en-
forcement must apply for a judicial order no more than 48 hours after the intercep-
tion. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 249.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).
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who will either deny the application or issue an order permitting
interception.87
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518, a federal judge may issue an inter-
cept order only if the judge determines that a number of require-
ments have been met.88 One such requirement is specificity. Not
only must the application specify the identity of the person upon
whom the surveillance is being conducted,89 but it must also specify
the nature and location of the intercepted communications, 90 as
well as describe the type of communications that law enforcement
is seeking to intercept.91 In addition, the application must identify
the agency authorized to intercept such communications 92 and the
period under which law enforcement wishes to conduct surveil-
lance.93 Although Title III permits extensions to the standard
thirty-day period of uninterrupted surveillance,94 such extensions
are granted only if law enforcement makes a renewed showing of
probable cause.95 A judicial order may also require the govern-
ment to file reports with the federal judge at specified intervals.96
According to § 2518(3), law enforcement must also establish
probable cause to obtain an interception order under Title III.
Law enforcement must prove that they have probable cause to be-
lieve the individual in question is involved in criminal activity relat-
ing to one of the enumerated offenses under Title 111, 97 and that
communications concerning that activity will be obtained through
the interception.98 In addition, law enforcement must have proba-
ble cause to believe that the facilities upon which they seek to con-
duct surveillance are commonly used by the individual in question,
or are being used in connection with the criminal activity.99
To secure an intercept order, Title III also requires a showing of
necessity and minimization. For example, law enforcement may
87. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)-(3). Judicial approval of intercept applica-
tions must be obtained by an appointed federal district judge, rather than a federal
magistrate. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
88. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)-(4) (laying out the requirements for ob-
taining an intercept order).
89. Id. § 2518(4)(a).
90. Id. § 2518(4)(b).
91. Id. § 2518(4)(c).
92. Id. § 2518(4)(d).
93. Id. § 2518(4)(e).
94. Id. § 2518(4)(e).
95. Id. § 2518(5); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 250.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6).
97. Id. § 2518(3)(a). The list of offenses can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
98. Id. § 2518(3)(b).
99. Id. § 2518(3)(d)
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not resort to electronic surveillance unless normal investigative
procedures have either failed or are too dangerous.100 Section
2518(5) also provides that surveillance should be conducted in a
timely manner so that the interceptions of communications, not
otherwise subject to surveillance, are minimized. 101 Furthermore,
in the event that communications are intercepted unlawfully, such
interceptions may be suppressed upon motion to the court.10 2
In addition to the stringent requirements necessary for the initia-
tion of electronic surveillance, Title III seeks to safeguard the pri-
vacy rights of individuals by establishing rules regarding the
disclosure of intercepted communications, as well as the illegal in-
terception of communications. Title III clearly establishes the lim-
ited circumstances under which intercepted communications may
be disclosed,0 3 and sets out a penalty scheme for unauthorized sur-
veillance activity.10 4
Furthermore, law enforcement's use of electronic surveillance is
closely monitored. Title III requires the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts ("AO") to file an annual report with Con-
gress. 10 5 These reports must provide specific information with re-
gard to the federal and state applications for intercept orders,
including the nature of the offenses under investigation, the cost of
surveillance and the number of convictions directly resulting from
the surveillance.10 6
100. Id. § 2518(3)(c); see also Chong v. DEA, 929 F.2d 729, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); see also United States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102, 108
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd 633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1980).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10). The inadmissibility of unlawfully intercepted evidence is
commonly referred to as the exclusionary rule. See supra note 27.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1)-(3) (permitting disclosure of intercepted communica-
tions only under three circumstances).
104. See id. § 2511(4)-(5) (noting that unlawful interceptions are a crime, punisha-
ble by fine or imprisonment); see also id. § 2520 (authorizing the recovery of civil
damages by persons whose communications have been disclosed in violation of Title
III).
105. 2000 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 65, at 5; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2519(3). Ac-
cording to § 2519(1)-(2), federal and state judges, as well as prosecutors, have a cer-
tain time period in which to file reports with the director of the AO concerning each
application they have either submitted or reviewed. 2000 WIRETAP REPORT, supra
note 65, at 6.
106. 2000 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 65, at 5.
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C. Congress Reacts to Technological Advancements: The
Introduction of New Legislation Broadens the Authority of
Federal Law Enforcement
Since Title III was enacted into law in 1968, there has been a
tremendous proliferation in communications technology. 10 7 Ad-
vancements in telecommunications technology have added a whole
new meaning to the term "communication," as individuals are now
able to correspond electronically on a level not anticipated by pre-
vious legislators. Recognizing that the privacy of such electronic
communications "could not be guaranteed absent legislation,"' 0 8
Congress responded by adopting new legislation that ultimately
broadened the power of federal law enforcement. Specifically,
Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986109 and the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act of 1994.110
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
In an effort to provide uniform legal standards with regard to the
interception of non-voice communications,"' Congress passed The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"). 112
This Act is significant because, among other things, it amended Ti-
tle III, extending the protections against unauthorized intercep-
tions to "electronic communications." '113 This extension was
deemed necessary because technological advances in communica-
tions had left a gap in the coverage of federal wiretap law." 4 Ac-
cording to § 2510(12), "electronic communications" are defined as
"any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or in-
107. For example, since that time, the world has seen the advent of the Internet,
cellular telephones and portable computers.
108. The Fourth Amendment and the Internet. Statement Before H.R. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong. 4 (2000) (statement of Gregory
T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, ACLU) [hereinafter Nojeim Testimony].
109. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2000)).
110. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 and various
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C. (2000)).
111. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 4 (1986).
112. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2000)).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000).
114. Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 289 (4th Cir. 1995).
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telligence... transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, elec-
tromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system. ' 115
In addition to amending Title III, the ECPA is also significant for
introducing two new chapters into federal law." 6 Specifically,
under "Chapter 121," Congress created requirements for the au-
thorized access of stored wire and electronic communications." 7
According to § 2702(b), such communications may be accessed by
the communications service provider, in addition to law enforce-
ment officials who have met the requisite standard.118 This chapter
is significant, because unlike "real-time" interception of electronic
communications, which requires the government to obtain a court
order under the auspices of Title 111,119 governmental access to
stored communications requires adherence to a far less demanding
standard.1 20
In fact, § 2703 sets out various means by which the government
may compel an electronic service provider to disclose the contents
of a subscriber's or customer's electronic communication. 21 Ac-
cording to § 2703(a), if the communication has been in storage in
the service provider's system for one hundred and eighty days or
less, the government may obtain that information provided it has a
search warrant issued by a federal magistrate based on a showing
of probable cause.' 2 Yet, once that same information has been in
electronic storage in excess of one hundred and eighty days, the
requisite standard for access becomes even less demanding.1 23 Spe-
cifically, the government may obtain the stored information
through an administrative subpoena combined with delayed notice
to the subscriber, or through a warrant if no notice is given. 24 The
government can also obtain these stored communications by
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 271.
116. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, ch. 121 & 206, 100 Stat.
1848 (introducing Chapter 121, "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Access" and Chapter 206, "Pen Registers and Trap and Trace
Devices.").
117. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, ch. 121, §§ 201-202, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (2000)). Stored communi-
cations are electronic communications, such as email, that have been retained in an
electronic communications system. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b).
119. See Nojeim Testimony, supra note 108, at 5.
120. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (listing the requirements for government access).
122. Id. § 2703(a); see also Nojeim Testimony, supra note 108, at 5.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).
124. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A)-(B)(i).
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presenting a court order." 5 Unlike the strict requirements that
must be met to secure a court order under Title III, under
§ 2703(d) the government need only show, "that there are reasona-
ble grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. ' 126 Ac-
cordingly, this standard falls far short of the probable cause re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment.
The ECPA also adopted a uniform procedure governing the use
and authorization requirements for pen registers and trap-and-
trace devices. 2 7 According to the ECPA, a pen register is a device
that identifies and records the telephone numbers dialed in an out-
going call, while a trap-and-trace device identifies and records the
telephone numbers from which incoming calls originate. 128
Through their attachment to a particular telephone line, such de-
vices allow law enforcement to trace the source of a suspect's out-
going and/or incoming calls.129 The introduction of statutory
language governing the use of these devices is significant because it
marks the first time that such devices were bound by a statutory
scheme. Because neither device has the ability to capture the con-
tent of a communication, the use of such devices has never been
regulated by either Title 111,130 or the Fourth Amendment. 3 1 In
fact, the Supreme Court has held that because there is no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy with respect to numbers dialed on a
telephone, pen registers do not constitute a "search" requiring
Fourth Amendment protection.132
Although the Supreme Court has refused to protect telephone
numbers under the Fourth Amendment, the ECPA is significant
because it requires law enforcement to obtain court orders to use
125. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii).
126. Id. § 2703(d).
127. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, ch. 206, 100 Stat. 1848.
Inserted as "Chapter 206" under Title 18 of the United States Code, these require-
ments were codified into law as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. See id.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4).
129. See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
These devices do not give law enforcement access to the content of the telephone
conversations; rather they provide authorities with the same information that tele-
phone companies have. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3127(3)-(4).
130. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1977) (finding that
because pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications, they therefore
do not "intercept" such communications within the meaning of Title III).
131. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979); see also Brown v. Waddell,
50 F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 1995).
132. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
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pen register and trap-and-trace devices. 133 Yet, unlike the height-
ened probable cause standard that must be met under Title III and
the Fourth Amendment, to obtain a court order for a pen register
or trap-and-trace device, the government must certify only "that
the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation being conducted by that agency. "134 In addi-
tion, any attorney for the government may make such an applica-
tion to the court, without prior approval from senior officials at the
Department of Justice. 35
Despite the significant changes in federal wiretap law imposed
by the ECPA, there are some shortcomings that have sparked con-
siderable debate. 136 While the ECPA expanded the scope and pro-
tections of federal law to encompass electronic communications, it
did so without strictly adhering to the standards set forth in Title
III. In addition to establishing less demanding standards for the
search and seizure of stored electronic communications and the use
of pen register devices, 137 the ECPA provides less protection for
electronic communications intercepted under Title III than it does
for voice communications. 138 For example, any government attor-
ney can authorize an application for an order to intercept elec-
tronic communications,1 39  and law enforcement can make
interceptions relating to any federal felony. 4' In addition, the stat-
utory exclusionary rule does not apply to electronic communica-
tions. 4' As a result, even if law enforcement agents unlawfully
intercept electronic communications, these communications can
still be admissible as evidence in court. 142
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a).
134. Id. § 3122(b)(2); see also United States Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 454.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(a).
136. See Nojeim Testimony, supra note 108, at 4-6.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 117-135.
138. Nojeim Testimony, supra note 108, at 4.
139. Id. at 5. In contrast, the interception of voice communications under Title III
requires authorization from a senior official at the Justice Department. See supra
note 86 and accompanying text.
140. Nojeim Testimony, supra note 108, at 5. Under Title III, voice communications
can only be intercepted if they relate to one of the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
141. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a) (applying the mandatory suppression of
illegally obtained evidence to wire and oral communications only, and not to email);
see also Nojeim Testimony, supra note 108, at 5; LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at
271.
142. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461
n.6 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Ted Bridis, Updating of Wiretap Law for E-mail Age is
Urged by the Clinton Administration, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2000, at A3.
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Because of the lower standards implemented by the ECPA, crit-
ics argue that electronic communications are not being given the
protection that Congress intended. 43 They argue that law enforce-
ment has the upper hand because it can avoid complying with Title
III's strict requirements by simply waiting until an electronic com-
munication becomes stored in the computer network (which hap-
pens immediately after delivery), rather than intercept the
communication en route.' 44 They also argue that because the ex-
clusionary rules do not extend to cover electronic communications,
there is no incentive for law enforcement agents to comply with the
proper procedures.45
Expressing concern over the relative ease with which law en-
forcement may intercept electronic communications, especially in
light of the FBI's Carnivore system, privacy groups and members
of Congress have proposed that the ECPA be amended to provide
stricter standards. One such proposal, House Bill 5018, The Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, was scheduled for a
mark-up before the House Judiciary Committee.1 46 This Act pro-
posed that the authorization standard for pen register and trap-
and-trace devices be raised to require a "reasonable suspicion" of
crime, and that the exclusionary rule of Title III be extended to
cover all electronic communications, including those that are
stored. 147 It also would have extended coverage of the reporting
requirements under § 2519 of Title III to stored communications. 148
Yet, despite the additional safeguards proposed by House Bill
5018, privacy advocates remained apprehensive, characterizing the
bill as inadequate. 49 Specifically, they were concerned that the bill
did not mention Carnivore, and that Congress would implement
proposals that would ease restrictions on electronic surveillance,
rather than enhance privacy protections. 50 Ultimately, the bill
143. Nojeim Testimony, supra note 108, at 5.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU, to Reps. Henry Hyde &
John Conyers, Chairman and Ranking Member, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept.
18, 2000), at http://www.aclu.org/congress/1091800.html (citing H.R. 5018, 106th Cong.
(2000)).
147. Id. at 2-4.
148. Id. at 4-5.
149. Id. at 1.
150. See id. at 1-5. Privacy advocates were very concerned about a Clinton Admin-
istration proposal that called for the implementation of nationwide pen register and
trap-and-trace orders, among other things. Id. at 5. These concerns may no longer be
warranted considering Attorney General Ashcroft's position on this topic. See infra
text accompanying notes 266-267.
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died before the end of the congressional session, and nothing new
has been proposed since that time.
2. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994
With the developments in communications technology imposing
greater challenges on law enforcement agencies, 151 Congress also
recognized the need for increased cooperation between law
enforcement officials and telecommunications companies. 52 Al-
though Title III and the ECPA already required telecommunica-
tions companies to cooperate with law enforcement officials
conducting electronic surveillance, neither act outlined the specific
responsibilities of the telecommunications industry. 153 As a result,
Congress passed The Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA"),154 which was the first statute
to impose an "affirmative obligation" on telecommunications com-
panies to modify the design of their equipment and facilities to
accommodate law enforcement and facilitate electronic
surveillance.55
Under CALEA, telecommunications service providers are re-
quired to "ensure that their systems are technically capable of ena-
bling law enforcement agencies operating with proper legal
authority to intercept individual telephone calls and to obtain cer-
tain 'call-identifying information.' ' ' 156 While the final congres-
sional bill did not provide specific technical requirements for
compliance, Congress delegated the initial determination of such
standards to industry participants. 157
Recognizing the inevitability of disagreement between the indus-
try and law enforcement officials, Congress determined that the
151. See discussion supra Part II.A.
152. See Carnivore and the Fourth Amendment: Statement Before the H.R. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong. 4 (July 24, 2000) (state-
ment of Robert Corn-Revere, Esq., Hogan & Hartson, LLP) [hereinafter Corn-Re-
vere's July Testimony].
153. Nylund, supra note 27, at 333. The FBI worried that with increasing competi-
tion among the telecommunications companies, it would have a much harder time
securing cooperation for surveillance activities unless there was some sort of "univer-
sal compliance." See Corn-Revere's July Testimony, supra note 152, at 4.
154. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-
414.
155. The Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Statement Before the H.R. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong. (Apr. 6, 2000) (statement of
Robert Corn-Revere, Esq., Hogan & Hartson, LLP) [hereinafter Corn-Revere's April
Testimony].
156. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
157. See Nylund, supra note 27, at 335.
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Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), acting as a media-
tor,158 would conduct public proceedings to resolve any conflicts. 159
Accordingly, the FCC resolved the challenges to the proposed
standards in August of 1999, when it issued its Third Report and
Order.160 In the Third Report and Order, the FCC set out the
technical standards required to achieve compliance under CALEA.
These standards combined the "J-Standard,"161 originally advo-
cated by the industry, with six out of nine additional "punch list
items" requested by the FBI.162
In an effort to invalidate some of these technical standards, in-
cluding four of the FBI's "punch list items," the telecommunica-
tions industry and privacy rights advocates challenged portions of
the FCC's Third Report and Order in federal court. 163  These
groups argued that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority by
"expand[ing] the types of call-identifying information that carriers
must make accessible to law enforcement agencies."'1 64 Deciding
the case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld
the inclusion of two of the challenged technical requirements 165
and vacated the portions of the FCC's Third Report and Order that
required telecommunications companies to implement certain ad-
vanced surveillance capabilities.166 Specifically, the court vacated
portions relating to the remaining four "punch list items," and re-
manded the case to district court. 167 Signaling a victory for privacy
advocates, the court ruled that the FCC's inclusion of these four
challenged "punch list items" lacked "reasoned decisionmak-
ing.,168
158. Id. at 336.
159. See Corn-Revere's July Testimony, supra note 152, at 5.
160. In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 14 F.C.C.R.
16794 (1999) [hereinafter Third Report and Order]; see also Nylund, supra note 27, at
336.
161. United States Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 455. The J-Standard, technically
known as the Interim Standard/Trial Use Standard J-STD-025, is a document which
"outlines the technical features, specifications, and protocols" that are required for
telecommunications carriers to make information available to authorized law enforce-
ment agents. Id. The Telecommunications Industry Association adopted this stan-
dard after two years of negotiations with the FBI. Id.
162. Id. at 456 (noting that the FBI petitioned the FCC to modify the J-Standard to
include nine additional capabilities it deemed necessary for compliance with
CALEA); see also Nylund, supra note 27, at 336.
163. United States Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 457.
164. Id. at 453.
165. Id. at 464-66.
166. Id. at 466.
167. Id. at 463.
168. Id.
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D. The New Challenge: Law Enforcement Reacts to the
Growth of Cyber Crime
The Internet transcends local, state and international bounda-
ries, in effect transforming the way we work, play and live on a
daily basis. With worldwide Internet usership projected at "250 to
300 million people by the end of the year 2000, ' ' 169 it appears as if
the phenomenon often referred to as the "information superhigh-
way" will continue to grow at a rapid pace.
Although the Internet superhighway has revolutionized global
communications and commerce, it has also paved a new avenue
upon which to conduct criminal activity.'70 In fact, according to the
FBI, over the last five years, there has been a "steady growth in
instances of computer-related crimes, including traditional crimes
and terrorist activities which have been planned or carried out, in
part, using the Internet.' 71 Acting as a "virtual community,"' 17 2
the Internet allows all of its users, including criminals, to interact in
a highly sophisticated manner. Criminals no longer have to rely on
communicating over traditional telephone lines, but instead can
use computers as instruments to commit crime. 73
The advent of Internet-related crime has posed a formidable
challenge for law enforcement. 174 Not only has such crime compli-
cated the enforcement of old laws and frustrated investigators' ef-
169. Communities Virtual and Real: Social and Political Dynamics of Law in Cyber-
space, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1586, 1586 n.1 (1999) [hereinafter Communities] (citing
Donald J. Karl, State Regulation of Anonymous Internet Use After ACLU of Georgia
v. Miller, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 513, 514 (1998)) .
170. See Howard W. Goldstein & Richard A. Izquierdo, Challenges Posed by In-
ternet Crime, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 7, 2000, at 5. According to the FBI, computer networks
are being utilized to commit new types of crime as well as to "facilitat[e] ... tradi-
tional criminal behavior." Freeh Testimony, supra note 25; see also Schwartz, supra
note 18 ("All manner of crimes - child pornography, fraud, identity theft, even terror-
ism - are being perpetrated using the Internet as a tool.").
171. Internet and Data Interception Capabilities Developed by FBI: Statement
Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong. 5
(July 24, 2000) (statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Laboratory Division, Federal
Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Kerr Testimony]. According to former FBI Di-
rector Louis J. Freeh, cybercrime is "one of the fastest evolving areas of criminal
behavior and a significant threat to our national and economic security." Freeh Testi-
mony, supra note 25.
172. Communities, supra note 169, at 1586.
173. See generally Goldstein & Izquierdo, supra note 170. The article points out
that computers are often: (i) the object of crime; (ii) the subject or site of the crime;
and (iii) the instrument used to commit the crime. Id. (citing Michael Hatcher et al.,
Computer Crimes, 36 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 397, 401 (1999)).
174. Freeh Testimony, supra note 25 ("The rapid advance of data technologies and
the unregulated nature of the Internet has resulted in a myriad of technologies and
protocols which make the interception of data communications extremely difficult.").
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forts of coordination, but it has also hindered the detection of
criminal activity. 7 5 It is, therefore, inevitable that law enforcement
will continually have to update its crime-fighting techniques to
match the technological advancements of the criminal world.176
Law enforcement has responded to the growing challenge of
computer crime by forming special task forces to investigate cyber-
crimes,'7 7 and by broadening the scope of its electronic surveillance
activities.' 78  Law enforcement has placed a renewed emphasis on
the search and seizure of stored computer files and electronic
data,179 and it has also developed new software to monitor the ac-
tivities of online users. 8 ° In addition, according to the 1999 Wire-
tap Report issued to Congress, there has been a dramatic increase
in the number of wiretap authorizations over the past ten years. 81
In fact, from 1998 to 1999 alone, there was a six percent increase in
the number of orders issued by federal judges.182 Furthermore, out
175. Id. (noting that advances in technology have "taken a serious toll" on the
government's ability to protect its citizens through the use of lawful electronic surveil-
lance); see also Goldstein & Izquierdo, supra note 170.
176. Robinson, supra note 4 (stating that systems such as Carnivore have become
more attractive to law enforcement "as the only way that governments can keep up
with the technological measures being adopted by criminals, terrorists and oppo-
nents"). Recognizing the difficulties in tracking sophisticated criminals, in 2000 the
Department of Justice proposed that judges be given the authority to issue pen regis-
ter and trap and trace orders with nationwide coverage. See Nojeim Testimony, supra
note 108, at 6
177. Bridget G. Brennan, Remarks at Fordham Law School (October 24, 2000).
178. Schwartz, supra note 18 ("[A]s the world has gone digital, criminals have as
well, and Internet taps are requested in a growing number of cases.").
179. See Edward A. Rial & Karen S. Popp, Search Warrants: Seizing Electronic
Data, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20, 2000, at B6. The authors point out that computer searches
have become more common as law enforcement officials recognize the advantage of
obtaining electronic documents. Id. Such benefits include: (i) the ability to recover
"lost" or "destroyed" documents; (ii) the ability to identify the author of a document,
as well as the time and date a document was created; and (iii) the ability to recognize
whether a document has been altered by comparing existing documents with previous
versions on backup. Id. Through standard search warrants, authorities have the abil-
ity to search and seize such computer data and/or computer hardware. Id.
180. See generally King & Bridis, supra note 8 (noting that Carnivore, the FBI's
new "superfast" system, has the ability to search email to track criminal suspects).
181. LEONIDAS R. MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1999 WIRETAP
REPORT 5, 7 (2002) [hereinafter 1999 WIRETAP REPORT], available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/wiretap99. The number of federal authorizations alone has in-
creased by nearly ninety-four percent. Id. at 5. Although wiretapping is often used as
a last resort, the FBI considers it an essential tool in fighting crime, Timothy B. Len-
non, Comment, The Fourth Amendment's Prohibition on Encryption Limitation: Will
1995 Be Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 467, 477-78 (1994) (citing Dorothy Denning, To
Tap or Not To Tap, COMM. ACM, Mar. 1993, at 26, 29).
182. 1999 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 181, at 7. Specifically, federal judges au-
thorized 601 applications, while state judges authorized 749. Id.
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of the total 1,350 wiretap applications applied for in 1999, federal
judges authorized all 1,350 of them, representing a one hundred
percent approval rate. 18 3
In addition to increasing the frequency by which it utilizes tradi-
tional surveillance techniques, law enforcement has also developed
other highly sophisticated mechanisms to keep pace with the tech-
nological capabilities of criminals. One such mechanism, Carni-
vore, was developed by the FBI in response to the increasing
number of investigations in which criminals use the Internet, spe-
cifically electronic mail ("email"), to communicate with each other
and their victims.' 84 Following implementation procedures under
the ECPA, Carnivore allows law enforcement to retrieve informa-
tion associated with a criminal suspect's electronic communication.
This system, specifically the breadth of its capabilities, has resulted
in a great deal of controversy over the past two years.1 85
Part II provides an in-depth analysis of the Carnivore system and
discusses the recent debate raging over its use. Part II continues by
highlighting an important consideration in the debate over privacy
versus protection. Specifically, it explores the premise that to be
worthy of Fourth Amendment protection, individuals must have a
legitimate expectation of privacy. This section also discusses recent
litigation and statements that, prior to September 11, 2001, sig-
naled a willingness on the part of the courts and the Bush adminis-
tration to address and possibly remedy privacy concerns. Part II
concludes by summarizing how the country's priorities have
changed since the events of September 11. This section also high-
lights the current debate over the constitutionality of the USA Pa-
triot Act, a purported "antiterrorism" bill passed in the aftermath
of September 11.
183. Id. ("Judges approved all applications."). Ironically, the 1999 Wiretap Report
accurately reflects the evolution of communications technology, citing the electronic
wiretap as the most common method of surveillance that year. Id. As opposed to
telephone wiretaps, which ranked second in utilization, electronic wiretaps constitute
surveillance of "digital display pagers, voice pagers, cellular phones, and electronic
mail." Id. at 10.
184. Carnivore: Diagnostic Tool, supra note 9.
185. See Evidence of FBI Evasions Feeds Carnivore Doubts, USA TODAY, Nov. 30,
2000, at 16A [hereinafter Evidence of FBI Evasions].
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II. OUR CHANGING WORLD: THE CLASH BETWEEN
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL
PRIVACY RIGHTS
A. Carnivore: Friend or Foe?
Carnivore is a software-based system utilized by the FBI to im-
plement judicially authorized surveillance of electronic communi-
cations. 18 6 Installed for the purpose of conducting criminal
investigations, Carnivore is a "powerful Internet wiretapping de-
vice ''I87 that has the ability to search for and retrieve information
pertaining to the electronic communications of particular criminal
suspects.18 Carnivore is used when other methods of gathering
such evidence "do not meet the needs of investigators or the re-
strictions placed by the court. ' 'R89
In addition to scanning millions of emails per second, 190 Carni-
vore is capable of intercepting information regarding instant mes-
saging, Web site access, and chat groups.' 9t According to the FBI,
Carnivore acts as a "sniffer," looking for specific information com-
ing across an ISP's network.192 Through the use of Carnivore,
agents are able to filter intercepted data "to eliminate material not
authorized for capture," and then store the data for review by the
FBI and the authorizing court. 193 Because Carnivore is an elec-
tronic device installed on the network of an ISP, the FBI relies on
the technical assistance and cooperation of ISP personnel in order
to conduct its surveillance. 194
186. Carnivore: Diagnostic Tool, supra note 9.
187. David S. Cloud, At Justice Department, a Conservative Takeover Looms, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 26, 2000, at A12.
188. John Schwartz, Wiretapping System Works on Internet, Review Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at A19.
189. ILL. INST. TECH. RESEARCH INST., INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE
SYSTEM: DRAFT REPORT viii (2000) [hereinafter INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF CARNI-
VORE]. For example, Carnivore is used when an Internet Service Provider, through its
own software, is unable to provide the FBI with the necessary data. Id.
190. King & Bridis, supra note 8.
191. Nick Wingfield & Don Clark, Internet Companies Decry FBI's E-Mail Wiretap
Plan, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2000.
192. Kerr Testimony, supra note 171, at 4; see also Ted Bridis & Neil King, Jr., Car-
nivore E-Mail Won't Eat Up Privacy, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2000, at A28. According to
the FBI, Carnivore allows agents "to identify a point through which Internet traffic
passes to and from a suspect named in a court order. The data is copied at that access
point, filtered ... [and] stored for review." Schwartz, supra note 18.
193. Schwartz, supra note 18.
194. Kerr Testimony, supra note 171, at 5. The FBI uses a special team of technical
agents to install and configure the equipment to comply with the collection restric-
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Initially conceived under the name "Omnivore" in 1997, the in-
troduction of Carnivore served as a technological update which
came into effect in June 1999.195 Although Carnivore is nearly
three years old, until recently many people did not know of its exis-
tence. In fact, the Carnivore system had been a well-kept secret
until its capabilities became widely reported in the press.' 96
After the initial reports on Carnivore sparked enormous interest
by the news media, Carnivore quickly became an "issue of major
public concern," prompting the Electronic Privacy Information
Center ("EPIC") to file a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
lawsuit against the FBI.' 97 This lawsuit sought to obtain FBI docu-
ments delineating Carnivore's source code, to assure privacy
groups that the system's capabilities could not go beyond their ad-
vertised reach. 198 The EPIC's document request was subsequently
granted, and on August 2, 2000, Judge Robertson of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the FBI
to set a schedule for the release of such documents. 199 Although
tions set forth in the court order. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF CARNIVORE, supra note
189, at viii.
195. Press Release, Electronic Privacy Information Center, FBI Releases Carnivore
Documents to EPIC: Privacy Group Says Disclosure Insufficient (Oct. 2, 2000) [here-
inafter EPIC October Press Release], at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore.
196. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Carnivore FOIA Litigation,
Hot Topics: Carnivore [hereinafter Carnivore FOIA Litigation], at http://
www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore (last visited Apr. 6, 2002). Although Robert Corn-
Revere provided testimony regarding Carnivore in April of 2000, it was not until mid-
July 2000 that the press picked up the story. Biting Into Carnivore, supra note 13, at
E3. In fact, according to the Washington Post, even White House Chief of Staff John
D. Podesta was "unaware" that the FBI was in the process of developing the Carni-
vore system until he read reports in the news media. John F. Harris & David A. Vice,
With Freeh, Mistrust Was Mutual; Relations Soured Over FBI's Role: For or Against
Administration?, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2001, at Al.
197. Carnivore FOIA Litigation, supra note 196; see also Nick Wingfield, ACLU
Asks Details on FBI's New Plan to Monitor the Web, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2000, at B7
(stating that the ACLU also filed a FOIA request, yet, unlike the situation with the
EPIC, no lawsuit ensued). It was not until the FOIA Amendments were passed in
1974 that FBI files became accessible to the public. Despite the increased accessibil-
ity, however, the FBI was subject to a number of exceptions and, therefore, was not
required to produce "classified information, information that might reveal FBI
sources or methods, and information that might violate the privacy rights of individu-
als referenced in FBI records." FBI REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 32, at ix.
198. See Timothy W. Maier & Michael Rust, FBI Unleashes Carnivore To Spy on
American's E-Mail, 16 INSIGHT MAG., Aug. 14, 2000, at 6.
199. Carnivore FOIA Litigation, supra note 196.
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these disclosures were ultimately made,2 00 a large number of docu-
ments were produced in completely redacted form.20 '
Since the initial disclosure of documents by the FBI in 2000, the
parties have continued to argue over whether the FBI conducted
an adequate search for responsive documents. 0 2 In response to
numerous motions by both parties, on March 25, 2002, the court
ordered the FBI to conduct an additional search of their records.20 3
In addition to the concern exhibited by privacy groups, news of
Carnivore's capabilities also worried members of Congress.20 4 As
a result, FBI officials were called to Capitol Hill to explain the sys-
tem to congressional leaders.20 5 Yet, despite the FBI's assurances
that surveillance would be conducted within legal limits, many
members of Congress remained skeptical, finding it hard to accept
the FBI's assurances without definitive proof.2 0 6
The most significant concern of privacy groups and Congress is
that Carnivore invades the privacy rights of innocent Internet users
by allowing "excessive monitoring of online communications. 2 0 7
Critics of Carnivore argue that in order for Carnivore to intercept
the targeted individual's electronic messages, the system must ana-
lyze and filter all email transmitted over the ISP network.20 8 Un-
200. The FBI disclosed approximately 1665 pages worth of documents. Elec. Pri-
vacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Justice, No. 00-1849 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2002).
201. EPIC October Press Release, supra note 195. The FBI has opposed the public
disclosure of Carnivore's operating system for arguably legitimate reasons. INDEPEN-
DENT REVIEW OF CARNIVORE, supra note 189, at xiv. According to the report issued
by the Illinois Institute of Technology, exposing Carnivore's technical limitations
could compromise the system, allowing criminals to circumvent its surveillance capa-
bilities. Id.; see also Ted Bridis, Carnivore Review Still Doesn't Ease Privacy Con-
cerns, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2000, at B6.
202. Biting Into Carnivore, supra note 13; Carnivore FOIA Litigation, supra note
196.
203. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Justice, No. 00-1849 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2002)
(agreeing with the EPIC that the FBI did not conduct an adequate search for respon-
sive documents); Biting Into Carnivore, supra note 13 (noting that the ordered search
must be completed by May 24, 2002); Carnivore FOIA Litigation, supra note 196.
204. Joel Cohen, How Far Will Computer Monitoring Go?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 2001,
at 1 (noting that even Republican conservatives such as Dick Armey, the House Ma-
jority leader, disapproved of Carnivore when its use was first made public); see also
Letter from John Collingwood, Assistant Director, FBI Office of Public and Congres-
sional Affairs, to Members of Congress on Carnivore Diagnostic Tool (Aug. 16, 2000),
at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress00/collingwood081600.html (responding to in-
quiries made to the FBI's offices).
205. See Elisabeth Frater, Law Enforcement: The Carnivore Question, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 2, 2000, at Technology.
206. See id.
207. Wingfield & Clark, supra note 191.
208. See King & Bridis, supra note 8; Maier & Rust, supra note 198.
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willing to rely on the FBI's assurances, privacy groups have
expressed a great concern over the breadth of Carnivore's capabili-
ties.209 This is especially true in light of the disclosure of an inter-
nal FBI memorandum obtained by way of the EPIC's FOIA
request.210 According to this document, tests conducted on Carni-
vore prove that it can "reliably capture and archive all traffic
through an Internet service provider. '211 This suggests that, in ad-
dition to targeting the communications of a specific individual, the
FBI could intercept the communications of innocent Internet users.
Furthermore, privacy groups are concerned about the apparent
lack of accountability associated with Carnivore,212 and argue that
law enforcement should be required to meet much tougher, uni-
form standards to conduct such surveillance.213
According to the FBI, Carnivore does not pose a threat to indi-
vidual privacy.214  Rather, Carnivore actually enhances privacy
rights by allowing law enforcement to apprehend cyber criminals
who pose a threat to the security of all.215 The FBI maintains that
Carnivore only gives law enforcement the ability to intercept and
collect electronic communications from individuals being investi-
gated subject to a court order.216 Specifically, the FBI asserts that
Carnivore has the "surgical ability to intercept and collect the com-
munications which are the subject of [a] lawful [court] order while
ignoring those communications which they are not authorized to
209. See Wingfield & Clark, supra note 191.
210. Schwartz, supra note 188.
211. Id. (quoting the FBI memorandum) (emphasis added); see also Dan Eggen &
David A. Vise, More Questions Surface About FBI Software; Wiretap Program Can
Archive All Internet Communications, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2000, at A03 (reporting
test results concluding that Carnivore can "retrieve all communications passing
through an Internet provider, not just those connected to a criminal suspect"). The
publication of this memo has led many privacy advocates to accuse the FBI of mis-
leading the public. Id.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 228-230, 232 and accompanying text.
213. See Frater, supra note 205. According to Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director
of the ACLU, one way in which law enforcement implements Carnivore is through a
pen register or trap-and-trace order, which requires a much lower standard. The
Fourth Amendment and Carnivore: Statement Before the H. R. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong. 2 (July 24, 2000) (statement of Barry
Steinhardt, Associate Director, ACLU). For a discussion of the required standard for
implementing a pen register or trap-and-trace devise, see supra notes 127-135 and
accompanying text.
214. See Frater, supra note 205.
215. Id.
216. Earthlink, FBI Agree to Drop Internet Surveillance Device, FLA. TIMES-UNION,
July 15, 2000, at B2.
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intercept. '217 The FBI also claims that, similar to a pen register or
trap-and-trace device, Carnivore only intercepts the identifying in-
formation of electronic communications, without scanning the con-
tent or even the subject line of the email. 18 This assertion has
allowed the FBI to implement Carnivore under the less-restrictive
rules of the ECPA, rather than through compliance with the more
stringent Title III standard of probable cause.21 9 Furthermore, in
addition to being authorized only through a strict court order, the
FBI maintains that Carnivore's use is limited, having been used in
only twenty-five investigations in the past eighteen months.2 °
Amid the growing controversy in the summer of 2000, former
Attorney General Janet Reno announced plans to disclose the
technical specifications of Carnivore. Such disclosures would be
made to a select "group of experts" who would conduct an inde-
pendent review to determine the exact capabilities of the system,
while at the same time dispel public concern.22 1 This review was
conducted by the Illinois Institute of Technology's Research Insti-
tute, which issued its initial report on November 17, 2000.
According to the report, Carnivore functions in a way that is
consistent with the FBI's initial explanation.22 2 The report con-
cludes that the installation and operation of Carnivore pose no op-
217. Carnivore: Diagnostic Tool, supra note 9.
218. See Frater, supra note 205; Schwartz, supra note 11.
219. Schwartz, supra note 11. According to the independent report, Carnivore can
be implemented either under Title III (when the FBI seeks to capture content) or
under the ECPA rules for pen register or trap-and-trace devices. Officials at the De-
partment of Justice admitted, however, that "the system has been used, in most cases,
under the less-restrictive [ECPA] rules." Id. It is important to note that The USA
Patriot Act, (see discussion infra Part II.C.), now specifically authorizes the imple-
mentation of Carnivore under the less-restrictive standards commonly used for pen
registers and trap-and-trace devices. This standard is less restrictive because it does
not require a showing of probable cause; rather, law enforcement must certify that the
information is "relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2)
(2000). For a comparison of the legal requirements necessary to implement Title III
and ECPA devices, see discussion supra notes 88-106, 127-142.
220. Bridis & King, supra note 192. In fact, current FBI Director Robert Mueller
recently stated that the use of Carnivore has "diminished substantially" because ISPs
have developed more sophisticated technology to independently monitor their cus-
tomers' online activities. Ted Bridis, FBI Still Stuck on the Source of Anthrax, AP
ONLINE NEWS SERV., Mar. 1, 2002.
221. Press Release, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Lawsuit Seeks Immedi-
ate Release of FBI Carnivore Documents (Aug. 2, 2000), at http://www.epic.org.
Many, however, question the independence of the review panel, complaining that it is
pro-law enforcement. Eggen & Vise, supra note 211, at A03.
222. Schwartz, supra note 188.
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erational or security risks to an ISP's network.223 The report also
concludes that Carnivore's technology can be a more effective
means of privacy protection and lawful surveillance, and that there
is an appropriate system of checks and balances in place.224 In ad-
dition, the report states that Carnivore does not monitor the online
activities and downloading preferences of every ISP customer.225
Despite these conclusions, critics of the system are still not satis-
fied.226 Citing the report's acknowledgement of Carnivore's defi-
ciencies, critics interpret the report as a confirmation of the
system's threat to privacy.227 Specifically, critics point to the re-
port's conclusion that, although Carnivore's operational proce-
dures appear sound, the system "does not provide protections,
especially audit functions, commensurate with the level of the
risks. ' 228 Moreover, Carnivore is deficient in its ability to protect
the integrity of the data it collects, 229 and the system cannot elimi-
nate the risk of unauthorized acquisition, both intentional and un-
intentional, of electronic communications by law enforcement
agents.23° In addition, the report validates the concerns of privacy
groups, noting that the system is capable of conducting broad
searches that would allow the FBI to "record any traffic it
monitors. ' 23 1 The report also offers proposals for how the system
could be improved, suggesting that more could be done to better
223. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF CARNIVORE, supra note 189, at xii. Yet, this asser-
tion remains uncertain, considering the technical difficulties experienced by Earthlink
after Carnivore was installed on its network. See infra notes 237-238 and accompany-
ing text.
224. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF CARNIVORE, supra note 189, at xii-xiii.
225. Id. at xiii.
226. Groups such as the ACLU and EPIC emphasize that the review failed to pro-
vide the necessary public discourse about Carnivore, a system which poses a "serious
threat to individual liberties." Press Release, ACLU, ACLU and EPIC Say Further
Study of Carnivore Review Proves "Beast Must Be Tamed" (Dec. 1, 2000), at http://
www.aclu.org/news/2000/n120100.html.
227. Evidence of FBI Evasions, supra note 185.
228. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF CARNIVORE, supra note 189, at xii. In fact, com-
puter security experts who analyzed the independent report concluded that "[s]erious
technical questions remain about the ability of Carnivore to satisfy its requirements
for security, safety and soundness." Schwartz, supra note 11.
229. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF CARNIVORE, supra note 189, at xiii; see also David
A. Vise & Dan Eggen, Study: FBI Tool Needs Honing; Panel Says 'Carnivore'
Software Can Be Altered To Protect Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2000, at A2.
230. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF CARNIVORE, supra note 189, at xi.
231. Id. at xiii. Although the report notes that the system records only the packet
segments that fall within certain specifications, it states that Carnivore is a "tool used
to examine all Internet Protocol packets on an Ethernet." Id.
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safeguard privacy from flaws in "human and organizational
controls. 23
2
Accordingly, critics cite the report as proof that: (1) the FBI mis-
led the public with respect to the assurances they made about Car-
nivore; and (2) Carnivore's "supposed" safeguards are impossible
to enforce.233 In addition, critics argue that Carnivore may not be
as useful as it had originally been portrayed, considering the in-
creasing availability of encryption software to would-be
criminals.234
In light of the independent review and the lingering controversy,
Carnivore's fate is seemingly unclear. To date, there have only
been a handful of legal challenges by ISPs resisting the installation
of Carnivore, and because of the secrecy of the related investiga-
tions, these decisions have remained under seal.235 One such case
involved the ISP Earthlink. Earlier this year, Earthlink challenged
a court order requiring it to install Carnivore.236 Despite the com-
pany's concerns over the privacy and security of its network, a fed-
eral magistrate judge ruled against Earthlink, compelling the
company to install the surveillance device. 237 Because Carnivore
was not compatible with Earthlink's software, the company was
forced to operate from an older version, thus causing its network to
crash.238 As a result, Earthlink refused to make any further instal-
lations, ultimately reaching an agreement with the FBI where, in
the future, the company would use its own software to collect
data.239
B. The Decline of a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in the
Internet Age
An important consideration in the growing debate over privacy
versus protection is whether individuals actually have a legitimate
expectation of privacy with respect to Internet use and communica-
232. Schwartz, supra note 188.
233. Evidence of FBI Evasions, supra note 185. The article points out that it is
impossible to subject employees who misuse Carnivore to criminal prosecution, be-
cause all Carnivore users share the same logon code. Id.
234. Id. (noting the ITT report's revelation that encryption software can "foil" Car-
nivore's system).
235. King & Bridis, supra note 8.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Nick Wingfield et al., Earthlink Says It Won't Install Device For FBI, WALL ST.
J., July 14, 2000, at A16.
239. Earthlink, FBI Agree to Drop Internet Surveillance Device, supra note 216.
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tions.24° Without such expectations, there is far less validity in the
arguments that the Fourth Amendment is being violated or that
privacy rights are being infringed.241 According to Robert Corn-
Revere, "The Internet revolution has altered the calculus for what
may be considered a reasonable expectation of privacy. ' 24 2 This
statement is an accurate reflection of the Internet's influence on
privacy rights, and supports the argument that privacy expectations
have eroded with increased Internet use. This argument is based
on many Internet users' suspicions that their computer transactions
may not be secure.243
Recognizing the technological capabilities associated with the
proliferation of Internet use, it is unrealistic to believe that an indi-
vidual's expectation of online privacy exceeds or even equals their
expectation of privacy within their own home. Rather, the frame-
work of the Internet poses unique security issues. Not only are
Internet users reminded throughout the course of their online ses-
sion that they are utilizing an unsecured connection, but they are
often asked whether they are willing to continue their transaction
under these circumstances. A user's willingness to proceed, over
what are clearly unsecured lines, signals an affirmative recognition
of the privacy risks associated with online use.
Another indicator of the decline in privacy expectations associ-
ated with the advent and proliferation of the Internet is the wide
array of tracking software available to companies and individual
citizens. For example, through the use of devices known as "cook-
ies," advertisers and marketing companies can target the individual
240. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying
notes 249-255.
241. See supra notes 51 & 132 and infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text. Al-
though the FBI, in its defense of Carnivore, has yet to argue that Internet users have
no legitimate expectation of privacy, this expectation has been a factor in the Su-
preme Court's consideration of how far to extend Fourth Amendment protection. See
supra text accompanying note 132. Therefore, because the use of Carnivore has ig-
nited a fierce debate about privacy rights that may ultimately be decided by the
courts, it is important to examine case precedent on privacy expectations involving
Internet use.
242. Electronic Privacy: Statement Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sub-
comm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong. 2 (Sept. 6, 2000) (statement of Robert Corn-
Revere, Esq., Hogan & Hartson, LLP).
243. See Cohen, supra note 204 (noting that most corporate employees are aware of
the probability that their email communications and visits to Internet sites are moni-
tored and stored). The realization that the communications sent over a computer
network may be less secure is especially apparent in the wake of the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001. In response to the attacks, Congress has made it easier for
law enforcement to conduct such electronic surveillance. See infra Part II.D.
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preferences of Internet users by tracking their activity while on-
line.244 Also, email users can now purchase software that provides
notification when the messages they have sent are opened by the
intended recipient, or even forwarded to a third party.245 In addi-
tion, many employers have installed software called "Superscout"
on their networks, which enables them to track an employee's
email and Internet activities.246 Through the use of this software,
companies are now starting to fire employees for surfing the net on
company time, in what has been dubbed "cyber-loafing. "247
Unfortunately for employees concerned with their privacy rights,
the courts have sided with employers, holding that "office prac-
tices, procedures, or regulations may reduce legitimate privacy ex-
pectations. ' 248 According to the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Simons, to establish a Fourth Amendment violation, a petitioner
has the burden 249 of proving that he has "a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. ' 250 In doing so,
a petitioner must show that this "subjective expectation of privacy
is one that society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable. 251
Courts have also used this standard of "subjective expectation"
to determine what protection to afford the personal information
that customers voluntarily turn over to their ISPs.2 5 2 For example,
in United States v. Hambrick, the Western District of Virginia
found that the petitioner could not seek Fourth Amendment pro-
tection despite the fact that law enforcement relied on an invalid
warrant to obtain personal information from his ISP.2 53 Pointing
out that individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy with
244. Amy Harmon, Software That Tracks E-Mail Is Raising Privacy Concerns, N.Y.
TiMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at Al.
245. Id.
246. Maier & Rust, supra note 198.
247. Id.
248. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 292 (2001). The court concluded that the warrantless search and seizure of
Simons' computer files did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation because,
based on his employer's policy, he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id.
249. Id. at 400.
250. Id. at 398 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)).
251. Id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988)).
252. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 504, 506 (W.D. Va. 1999), affd, 225
F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000).
253. Id. at 506-09.
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regard to information voluntarily turned over to third parties,254
the court refused to suppress the evidence obtained.255
C. Recent Litigation and Shifting Partisan Policies Send a
Positive Signal to Privacy Advocates Prior to September 11, 2001
Recent decisions have reinforced the limitations of Fourth
Amendment protection by holding that individuals must prove a
legitimate expectation of privacy to have a valid claim. Neverthe-
less, the courts have signaled a willingness to control the authority
of law enforcement by making it more accountable for its surveil-
lance activities. For example, the District Court for the District of
Columbia granted the EPIC's initial document request under the
FIA. 56 The court rejected the FBI's efforts to delay the produc-
tion of documents relating to Carnivore, instead requiring them to
set a schedule for immediate disclosure. 57 Furthermore, the dis-
trict court recently granted a renewed request for responsive docu-
ments by the EPIC, holding that the FBI's initial production did
not represent an adequate search.258
Another illustration of the courts' willingness to control law en-
forcement's authority, with respect to electronic surveillance tech-
nology, is United States Telecom Association v. FCC. In this case,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia criticized the
FCC's inclusion of four of the "punch list items" proposed by the
FBI, finding the FCC's decision defective.259 This decision effec-
tively limited the FBI's control over the telecommunications
industry.
However, United States Telecom Association v. FCC is also sig-
nificant because, in its opinion, the court clearly stated, "CALEA
does not cover 'information services' such as email and [I]nternet
254. Id. at 508 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)). The court
also pointed out that there is no reason to believe that the ECPA intended for there
to be a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to a person's "name, address,
social security number, credit card number, and proof of Internet connection." Id.
255. Id. at 509.
256. Carnivore FOIA Litigation, supra note 196. For additional discussion, see
supra text accompanying notes 197-199.
257. Carnivore FOIA Litigation, supra note 196. See supra text accompanying note
199.
258. Carnivore FOIA Litigation, supra note 196. See supra text accompanying
notes 202-203.
259. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See
supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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access." 260 This statement suggests that, unlike telecommunica-
tions companies, ISPs may not have to make their systems compli-
ant with the surveillance technology of law enforcement agencies.
Also, the recent Earthlink litigation 261 proves that it may not even
be necessary to install Carnivore on the networks of ISPs, since
most ISPs have their own surveillance capabilities. 262 These fac-
tors, along with independent study results that cast doubt on Carni-
vore's ability to safeguard privacy,263 may ultimately make it easier
for ISPs to challenge court orders mandating the installation of
Carnivore on their networks. ISPs can argue that CALEA was
never intended to require compliance by online communications
networks, therefore the installation of Carnivore is not necessary.
They can also argue that the privacy expectations of their custom-
ers require law enforcement to meet higher standards to justify the
installation of surveillance devices on their networks.
In addition to the above factors suggesting the courts may favor
a more limited scope for Carnivore, it also seems likely that had
the events of September 11 never happened, our government's pri-
orities would continue to reflect a balance between privacy and
protection, rather than an uncompromising focus on security at any
cost.264 In fact, prior to September 2001, it seemed likely that both
Congress and the Bush Administration were willing to consider a
legislative solution to privacy concerns.265 Specifically, observers
note that Attorney General John Ashcroft, at one time, may have
supported legislation restricting law enforcement's power of sur-
veillance in favor of increased privacy rights for individuals and
businesses.266 During his time in the Senate, Mr. Ashcroft sup-
ported efforts by businesses to encrypt their communications as
well as efforts by privacy groups seeking to curb the government's
260. United States Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 455 (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§§ 1001(8)(C)(i), 1002(b)(2)(A) 2000). The court pointed out that in enacting
CALEA, Congress intended on "preserv[ing] the status quo" by giving law enforce-
ment "no more and no less access to information than it had in the past." Id. at 455
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-827, pt.1, at 22 (1994)).
261. See supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.
262. Bridis, supra note 220 (quoting FBI Director Robert Mueller).
263. See text accompanying notes 226-232.
264. See infra Part II.D.
265. For a discussion of the privacy concerns of both members of Congress and
members of the Bush Administration, see supra notes 204-206 and infra notes 266-
268.
266. Cloud, supra note 187. Although prior to September 2001, Attorney General
Ashcroft had never criticized Carnivore specifically, his record in the Senate was criti-
cal of privacy intrusions by the government. Schwartz, supra note 18.
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power to conduct wiretaps on the Internet.267 The Republican
leadership in Congress also displayed strong resistance to Carni-
vore when the news reports surfaced last summer, suggesting that
Carnivore should be shut down until the privacy concerns were
addressed. 68
D. Changing Priorities in the Wake of a National Tragedy: The
Introduction of the USA Patriot Act
Despite the continued concerns of many privacy advocates and
members of Congress over surveillance tools such as Carnivore,2 69
the events of September 11, 2001 have dramatically changed the
nation's priorities.27 ° Specifically, just six months after the terrorist
attacks, "high-tech tools that once were considered too intrusive
are becoming part of everyday life in America."'27x Rather than
worrying about a potential intrusion on their civil liberties, many
American citizens are more concerned with feeling "a sense of
safety.
272
In response to these shifting priorities, the Bush Administration
quickly devised numerous antiterrorism measures to strengthen the
power of federal law enforcement and bolster the confidence of the
American public.273 Specifically, within days of the terrorist at-
tacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft began pressuring Congress
to adopt legislation that would expand the surveillance power of
law enforcement. 274 By October 26, 2001, the Bush Administration
had signed into law a new antiterrorism bill entitled, "Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
267. Cloud, supra note 187.
268. Schwartz, supra note 18. Republican leaders are concerned that the invasive
nature of the technology allows government to infringe on basic constitutional rights.
Id.; Cohen, supra note 204.
269. See discussion infra notes 279-287, 290 and accompanying text.
270. Pogue, supra note 6 (noting the general change in priorities among many
Americans, and suggesting that, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Americans
may be more willing to sacrifice their privacy rights in exchange for greater security).
271. Balint, supra note 6 (comparing Americans' attitudes towards electronic sur-
veillance today with those they held prior to September 11, 2001).
272. Id. While many Americans were "increasingly wary of privacy invasions by
companies or by the government" prior to September 11, 2001, security concerns are
now paramount. Guernsey, supra note 7. The author compares the events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 to national crises of the past, noting that Americans have often been
willing to "sacrifice some privacy in the name of security." Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.; Pogue, supra note 6.
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to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001" ("The USA Pa-
triot Act").275
The USA Patriot Act has made it easier for law enforcement to
monitor the activities and communications of Internet users.276
The USA Patriot Act specifically authorizes the monitoring of
electronic communications under the less-stringent standards of
the ECPA.27 7 Specifically, The USA Patriot Act allows Internet-
based communications to be intercepted using the same implemen-
tation procedures as a pen register or trap-and-trace device.278 As
a result, the use of tools such as Carnivore will only require the
government showing "that the information likely to be obtained is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. 279
Although the Bush Administration claims that the expansion of
electronic surveillance capabilities under the USA Patriot Act is a
necessary tool in the war against terrorism, there are many Ameri-
cans who disagree. 280 For example, many critics argue that the
Bush Administration's antiterrorism legislation was enacted too
expeditiously and without regard to proper procedure. 281 Accord-
ing to media reports, it took the Senate a mere thirty minutes to
expand federal wiretap laws in the wake of September 11.282
Avoiding the usual procedures of debate and amendment, Con-
gress essentially accepted the legislation on a mandate from the
executive branch, leaving many privacy advocates wary that the
275. The USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Robinson,
supra note 4.
276. Balint, supra note 6.
277. Guernsey, supra note 7 (stating that Ashcroft had proposed that the words
"electronic communications" be added to existing telephone surveillance laws); Anna
Kandra, National Security vs. Online Privacy: The New Anti- Terrorism Law Steps Up
Electronic Surveillance of the Internet, PC WORLD, Jan. 1, 2002. The existing tele-
phone surveillance laws, namely pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, are cur-
rently authorized under the ECPA. See supra text accompanying notes 118-124 for
the necessary implementation requirements.
278. Kandra, supra note 277.
279. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2001); see also supra notes 133-135 and accompanying
text.
280. Robinson, supra note 4 (noting how the debate over privacy versus protection
has been revived since September 11, 2001); see also Kara Swisher, Boom Town: Will
the Hunt for Terrorists Target Privacy?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2001, at B1 (noting the
policy efforts being made by privacy advocates to ensure the civil liberties of online
users in the wake of new antiterrorism legislation).
281. Robinson, supra note 4 ("[I]n the race to protect the public from terrorist ac-
tivity, essential values such as freedom of expression and the right to communicate
without fear of eavesdropping are being ignored.").
282. Swisher, supra note 280.
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constitutional safeguard of checks and balances had been
disregarded.283
Many privacy advocates also criticize The USA Patriot Act be-
cause it implicitly authorizes the use of surveillance tools such as
Carnivore to intercept electronic communications, yet conditions
the implementation on a less stringent standard.284 Privacy advo-
cates from the American Civil Liberties Union are quick to point
out that they do not necessarily oppose the idea that law enforce-
ment should have access to such information. They do believe,
however, that law enforcement should have to meet higher stan-
dards to access that information.285
Questions have also surfaced about how effective increased elec-
tronic surveillance will be in preventing crime and future terrorist
attacks.286 Specifically, some critics argue that electronic surveil
lance is only effective if there are enough law enforcement agents
to sift through it for analysis.287 In addition, many security experts
agree that electronic surveillance should not become a substitute
for hands-on intelligence gathering by live agents working in the
field.288
III. PUTTING THE LEASH ON LAW ENFORCEMENT: CARNIVORE
SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO TITLE III SCRUTINY
A. Congress Must Reevaluate the Law and Extend
Title III Protections
The proliferation in communications technology has not only
changed the way people conduct their daily lives, but it has also
changed the way that law enforcement investigates criminal activ-
ity. These technological advancements pose great challenges to the
competing interests of privacy advocates and law enforcement, as
the existing legal rules are being stretched beyond their limits.
283. Cohen, supra note 204.
284. The USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). See supra
notes 277-279 and accompanying text.
285. Guernsey, supra note 7 (asserting that Carnivore is capable of intercepting the
content of communications, and therefore, the stricter standards of Title III should
apply).
286. Ted Bridis & Gary Fields, Fight Over Civil Liberties, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
2001, at Al ("[E]xpanding surveillance authority doesn't necessarily lead to more ef-
fective law enforcement."); Guernsey, supra note 7 (suggesting that there is such a
thing as "too much surveillance").
287. Bridis & Fields, supra note 286.
288. Guernsey, supra note 7.
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The concern over electronic surveillance, and specifically Carni-
vore, is not limited to privacy advocates and concerned citizens.
Rather, the drafting of House Bill 5018 and the hearings on Carni-
vore, before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, signal
Congress's concern as well.2 89 Specifically, members of Congress
are concerned that Carnivore allows the government to infringe
upon Americans' "basic constitutional protection against unwar-
ranted search and seizure. ' 290 Even though the debate in Congress
has stalled since September 11, and The USA Patriot Act passed
with overwhelming support, some members of Congress have not
been deterred from expressing their continued concern.9
Considering the strong debate sparked by the introduction of
Carnivore, Congress should respond by repealing portions of The
USA Patriot Act and amending existing wiretap laws. While Con-
gress cannot and should not ignore the fact that electronic surveil-
lance is a necessary means of crime prevention, it must not sacrifice
fundamental civil liberties. Congress must recognize that current
implementation procedures for Carnivore are effectively allowing
law enforcement to evade the very safeguards that federal wiretap
legislation was designed to ensure.292 While the FBI has always
had the ability to intercept communications that fall outside the
scope of its warrants, the exclusionary rule and disciplinary mea-
sures under Title III have served as a deterrent from law enforce-
ment officials engaging in unauthorized activity.293  More
importantly, these safeguards have served as a protection mecha-
nism against governmental abuse.294 By not extending these safe-
guards to cover electronic communications, 295 the government is
asking individuals to trust the FBI and other government intelli-
gence agencies, without providing any protection in return. In ef-
289. See Congressional Statements, FBI Press Room, at http://www.fbi.gov (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2002); supra Part II.A.
290. Schwartz, supra note 18.
291. See EPIC Alert, Electronic Privacy Communication Center, at http://
www.epic.org (Vol. 8.20 dated Oct. 12, 2001) (referring to unsuccessful protests
mounted by various senators prior to the passage of The USA Patriot Act); see also
Madanmohan Rao, Technology: Creating a Smart and Secure Cyberspace, INTER
PRESS SERV., Mar. 25, 2002 (quoting United States Congressman Bob Barr who still
feels that "effective oversight mechanisms" are necessary particularly with respect to
Carnivore).
292. See supra Part I.B.
293. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 136-142.
2272
PRIVACY VERSUS PROTECTION
fect, the government is asking Americans to put their faith in a
system with a history of corruption.296
Accordingly, as it has done so many times in the past, Congress
must reevaluate the delicate balance between the privacy interests
of the public and law enforcement, and recognize that the wiretap
laws, as currently written, no longer provide adequate safeguards
for privacy. Congress must adopt stricter and more uniform stan-
dards with regard to electronic surveillance to ensure that the pro-
tection of privacy rights remains a national priority.
Carnivore should not be treated as a mere pen register.297 De-
spite the FBI's claims that Carnivore only intercepts the identifying
information of a particular person's incoming or outgoing email,
both the FBI's own internal document and an independent report
contradict this assertion.298 Carnivore goes beyond the traditional
scope of what pen register devices were developed to intercept,299
as it can search the actual contents of communications on an ISP's
network, rather than just the mere identifying information associ-
ated with a criminal suspect's email address. Some have argued
that Carnivore cannot be compared to a pen register because
knowledge of a suspect's email address is much more intrusive and
may reveal more about a person's identity than a phone number
can.3" Because the breadth of Carnivore's capabilities far exceeds
that of a pen register, Carnivore should neither be compared to
such a limited device, nor authorized under a pen register's weak-
ened standard. °1
In short, Congress must require that the authorization procedure
for the use of Carnivore conform to the strict requirements of Title
111.302 For example, any new legislation should make it clear that
for law enforcement agents to use devices like Carnivore, they
must comply with the particularity and minimization requirements
set forth in Title 111. 303 Any interceptions that fall outside of the
targeted communications must be considered unauthorized, and
296. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
297. See supra notes 277-278 and accompanying text.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 210-211, 229-231.
299. Specifically, pen registers and trap-and-trace devices were intended to inter-
cept mere identifying information, namely telephone numbers being dialed into and
out of a particular telephone receiver. See supra text accompanying notes 128-129.
300. Ted Bridis, FBI's E-mail Suggests Divisions on Legality of Web Surveillance,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2000, at B9. These attorneys argue, as a result, that email ad-
dresses should be afforded more privacy protections than telephone numbers. Id.
301. For a discussion on this standard, see supra notes 133-135.
302. See supra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 89-93, 100-101 and accompanying text.
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therefore off-limits for use in a criminal prosecution.3 °4 Also, in
order to provide for more accountability, the exclusionary rules
under Title III must be extended to cover all forms of electronic
communication, and law enforcement agents should be required to
obtain the approval of senior Justice Department officials before
applying for a court order to install Carnivore.3 °5 In addition, the
standards for seizing stored communications must be heightened to
require, at minimum, a showing of probable cause.30 6
If Congress is not willing to subject Carnivore to complete Title
III scrutiny, it should at least introduce new legislation explicitly
stating that pen register and trap-and-trace orders served on ISPs
do not authorize access to the content of communications, includ-
ing the subject lines of electronic mail. If law enforcement agents
violate this restriction, they should be subject to the same discipli-
nary penalties and evidentiary exclusions provided under Title
111.307
CONCLUSION
As our world continues to advance technologically, scholars pre-
dict that the Internet will "begin to seem less separate from our
daily lives.130 8 As the distinctions between the virtual world and
the real world begin to fade, it appears likely that individuals will
increasingly demand and legitimately expect the same privacy pro-
tection online that they expect in their own homes. As a result,
Congress must take affirmative steps to ensure that all means of
electronic surveillance comply with the Fourth Amendment and
that the implementation of certain devices complies with the strict
standards of Title III.
Despite the outcome of the study conducted on Carnivore and
the events of September 11, 2001, public outrage over Carnivore's
existence and use clearly has not subsided. In fact, the concerns
over Carnivore, while originally based on speculation regarding the
system's capabilities, may be justified now more than ever.30 9 Al-
though the study conducted by the Illinois Institute of Technology's
304. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
306. Compare supra text accompanying notes 120-126, with supra text accompany-
ing notes 97-99.
307. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
308. Communities, supra note 169, at 1596 (citation omitted).
309. Public disclosure of information concerning Carnivore is especially important
in the aftermath of September 11, because such investigative techniques are likely to
increase in use. See Balint, supra note 6 ("By all indications, law enforcement agen-
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Research Institute concluded that Carnivore performs in many
ways as advertised by the FBI, privacy advocates argue that the
report's conclusions and recommended improvements 310 demon-
strate system deficiencies that undermine privacy protection. Fur-
thermore, it is clear that suspicions will continue to mount until
Congress passes legislation that specifically delineates the specific
categories of information that devices such as Carnivore may
intercept.
Even if the controversy over Carnivore eventually subsides, the
legal debate over electronic surveillance will undoubtedly continue
for some time. As technological advancements continue to revolu-
tionize the way in which criminals communicate, law enforcement
will be forced to develop even more sophisticated means of surveil-
lance.31 The FBI will no longer be satisfied with the interception
of mere identifying information, and will use Carnivore and other
devices to intercept the content of electronic communications.
This expanded capability will likely draw new criticism from pri-
vacy advocates, claiming, once again, that law enforcement has
overstepped its authority.
Rather than overburden the courts with continuous litigation
seeking to determine whether law enforcement officials have acted
within their legal authority, Congress must take the initiative and
develop consistent and detailed standards under which electronic
surveillance may be conducted. Congress must amend portions of
the ECPA to adhere to the more stringent standards of Title III
and the Fourth Amendment, and it must extend Title III protection
to cover the use of invasive devices such Carnivore. In addition,
cies are stepping up their use of technology that can record Internet use, from e-mails
to Web surfing to online chats.").
310. See supra text accompanying notes 228-232.
311. In fact, the FBI is already in the process of updating Carnivore, a process that
will undoubtedly enhance the system's surveillance capabilities. See INDEPENDENT
REVIEW OF CARNIVORE, supra note 189, at vii. Also, in November 2001, the FBI
acknowledged the existence of another technologically advanced surveillance system
known as "Magic Lantern." Kim Zetter, New Technologies, Laws Threaten Privacy:
The FBI's 'Magic Lantern' Keystroke Logger Could Help Catch Terrorists, But at What
Cost to Your Fundamental Rights?, PC WORLD, Mar. 1, 2002. Although it has not yet
been deployed, Magic Lantern is a "virus-like program" that will allow federal agents
to capture electronic communications before a user's encryption software kicks in. Id.
Through manual installation or a simple email, Magic Lantern invades a user's com-
puter and, after activation, allows agents to record the user's keystrokes. Elizabeth
Clark, Illuminating Magic Lantern, NETWORK MAG., Feb. 1, 2002. In effect, Magic
Lantern acts as an enhancement to Carnivore, since the Carnivore system fails when
confronted with encrypted files. Robinson, supra note 4.
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Congress must hold law enforcement accountable for compliance
with these standards.
Although the advent and proliferation of the Internet has dra-
matically altered the traditional privacy expectations of individuals
with respect to their online activity, online users should not be pe-
nalized for embracing this emerging technology. In choosing to ac-
cess the information superhighway, to take advantage of the
convenience of electronic communication, Internet users should
not have to forfeit the most basic principles of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Instead, Congress must take the necessary steps to put an
end to this controversy. To reflect our changing times, Congress
must adopt detailed laws that will put the privacy concerns of citi-
zens to rest, as well as provide the courts with much needed
guidance.
